

These considerations will follow two lines: (a) they will think about a "house" in the context of the present reformulation of the processes of communication; (b) they will think about "color" in the context of the present recording of cultural messages. Finally (c) they will try and have those two lines converge. Such consideration can in no way be exhaustive, since the two perspectives suggested above are limited and since a paper as this one is itself limited. Still: they may throw some light on these problems and thus serve future dialogues.

(a) The problem "house" exceeds by far the competence of architecture and urbanism, and this is becoming painfully obvious at present. Architects and urbanists, far from being projectors of houses and sets of houses, are shown at present to be functions of an existential project which embraces all the parameters of living. To sum up brutally that project as it emerges: the establishment of a universal dialogical and intersubjective network the threads of which carry information to be stored and processed within its knots. Which implies a new anthropology: Man as a knot within an intersubjective network, and as one who becomes such a knot (who becomes "man") by receiving, storing, processing and transmitting information. In short: Man is one committed to the dialogical conversation against entropy. In such a project architects and urbanists appear as those men who are committed to the establishment of knots within the network. And this must be done in function of the material and/or immaterial cables which constitute the network.

This does not fit the traditional notion of "house". For our tradition "man" is an individual and may be defined and identified as such. Either as an organism distinct from other organisms, or as a "mind/spirit" distinct from other "minds/spirits", or as a distinct "mind/spirit" within a distinct organism. Such a "hard" (relying) anthropology implies that man is a thing in motion. Under analysis that motion is shown to be pendular; it oscillates between an advance toward the world (called "adventure"), and a return toward itself (called "self") while advancing (during adventure) man loses himself within the world, while returning (during selfishness) man loses the world, and this is precisely the Hegelian "unhappy consciousness" which is human consciousness "tout court". Now it is this traditional anthropology which implies the traditional "house" notion. It is the point of departure toward adventure and of return toward selfishness. Thus it consists of four elements: walls to distinguish between the world and the self, a roof to distinguish between human motion and the immovable transcendent, a door to permit the passage, and windows to permit permeability between the realms defined by the house. The problem of traditional architecture is the ambiguity of such a house notion, (which is proper to any notion of delimitation). How is one to distinguish between the private, the public and the transcendent space, and at the same time permit circulation between those spaces?

This is no longer our own problem. The notion of an "individual" is no longer meaningful, after calculations had shown that anything may be divided.